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Discourse has been analyzed in philosophy since the earliest 
thinkers. It can be understood as the saying of something about 
something through language. As such, it encompasses both speak­
ing and writing, and requires interpretation on behalf of all parties 
involved. Discourse displays, or makes manifest, a world of con­
cerns. As a referential facet of discourse, this entails the taking of 
given words or objects to convey certain meanings.1 For Paul 
Ricoeur, this is a "metaphorical reference," in which this making 
manifest occurs against the understanding of metaphors. This is in 
the context of the field of hermeneutics, of which the central problem 
is, for Ricoeur, interpretation. 
In his work, Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics, 
Ricoeur connects the revealing of meaning through metaphor to the 
hermeneutic duty of interpretation by displaying the parallels be­
tween metaphor and text. Including both under the heading of 
discourse, Ricoeur displays how the understanding of metaphor can 
adequately explain the proper understanding of larger texts, includ­
ing the world (given the metaphor of the world as a text). With an 
understanding of this project, and its conclusion that the interpreta­
tion of metaphor can be used to explain hermeneutical problems of 
interpreting larger texts and even the world, Ricoeur undertakes in 
other works the task of interpreting the metaphorical reference 
fowld within religion, faith, atheism, and so on. 
Inhis essay, "Religion, Atheism, and Faith/' Ricoeur undertakes 
such a project. His hypothesis, as I will explore in much more detail 
below, asserts "atheism is not limited in meaning to the mere 
negation and destruction of religion but that, rather, it opens up the 
horizon for something else, for a type of faith that might be called, in 
a way that we shall further elucidate, a postreligious faith or a faith 
for a poslreligious age."2 This hypothesis is formed with respect to 
a Nietzschean atheism, and includes Ricoeur's interpretation of 
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such. In the following pages I wish to offer an analysis of Ricoeur's 
project. This will include a discussion of Ricoeur' s notion of 1/meta­
phorical reference" with regard to hermeneutics, and how it is 
utilized in his essay. I will also analyze Nietzsche's atheism through 
a brief treatment of The Gay Science (specifically, section 125 of Book 
Three, The Madman). Upon offering an understanding of each, and 
displaying what it is that Ricoeur is attempting in his essay, I will 
develop an argument against Ricoeur's original hypothesis, show­
ing that it is impossible for any system of faith or morality to emerge 
from Nietzsche's notion of the death of God. 
Nietzsche utilizes a type of hermeneutics that entails a critique of 
cultural representations, which he considers to be disguised effects 
of the will and of fears. For Nietzsche, Ricoeur suggests, 1/the cultural 
dimension of human existence, to which ethics and religion belong, 
has a hidden meaning which requires a specific mode of interpreta­
tion, a stripping-away of masks."3 Ricoeur names the hermeneutics 
of Nietzsche "reductive hermeneutics./I It is a reduction of such 
cultural representations, the "stripping-away" mentioned above, 
which drives Nietzsche's perspectivist view of interpretation. 
Nietzsche's hermeneutics works as a genealogy, Le., inThe Genealogy 
ofMorals, he attempts to get back to the origin of religious values and 
morality. 
Nietzsche reveals the notion of a supreme or ideal being as an 
exterior realm, both outside of and superior to humanvolition. From 
this exterior realm, then, humans receive restrictions and condemna­
tion. However, Ricoeur suggests that, for Nietzsche, this realm is 
"nothing."4 As Nietzsche blatantly explains early in The Genealogy of 
Morals, this realm is nothing more than the result of the weakness, 
rancor, and resentment of the slave morality. Nietzsche's hermeneu­
tic task, then, is to reveal this origin of religious values as nothingness 
or void, exposing hence, that the God of morality - or on a meta­
physical level, the absolute good or the One- does in fact not exist. 
Ricoeur notes, and rightfully so, proposing such a reduction of 
hermeneutics brings about the destruction of metaphysics and nec­
essarily leads to nihilism.5 What Nietzsche attempts to do, is to 
expose the emptiness behind the genealogy of morals, thus destroy­
ing the foundation of metaphysics, in order to move, as he asserts, 
beyond good and evil. 
Ricoeur elaborates this notion with the example of TI1e Madman. 
With regard to the well known assertion of this section in The Gay 
29 A CRITIQUE OF RICOEUR'S CALL FOR FAITH 
Science, that God is dead6, Ricoeur posits what he believes to be the 
more central question. He notes, UBut the true question is to know, 
first ofaltwhich god is dead; then, who has killed him (if itis true that 
this death is a murder); and finally, what sort of authority belongs to 
the announcement of this death."7 In an analysis of the madman's 
words, we can answer at least the first two of these questions. The 
madman cries: 
Whither is God? ... I will tell you. Wehave killed him - you and 
I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How 
could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe 
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we 
unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is itmoving now? 
... Are we not plunging continually? Do we not need to light 
lanterns in the morning? '" God is dead. God remains dead. 
And we have killed him.B 
As to Ricoeur's second question, the madman explains that this 
death in fact was a murder, and that the murderers are us; we have 
killed God. Ricoeur suggests that it is not the atheist that has killed 
God, but rather this nothingness that lies beneath the notion of the 
ideal, i.e. the process of nihilism as mentioned above. 
The first question, ns to which god is dead, is answered upon a 
closer analysis. Let us examine some of the repercussions of this 
death. The madman wonders where the world will move now, how 
the entire horizon has been wiped up, and whether we are not amid 
a continual plunge consequently. Such consequences suggest that 
the death results in total chaos; Being itself will be cast into all 
directions. In the suggestion of lighting lanterns in the morning, we 
even receive the notion of insanity or simply the suggestion of being 
lost, not knowing what to do, and hence, doing something as ridicu­
lous as lighting lanterns in the morning. Such effects of this death 
point to which god is dead. It is precisely as Ricoeur suggested, as I 
noted earlier, the god of metaphysics. And, as Ricoeur notes, 
"insofar as theology rests on the metaphysics of the first cause, 
necessary being, and the prime mover, conceived as the source of 
values and the absolute good,"9 it is also the god of theology, or the 
god of morality. 
It is here where Ricoeur introduces the notion of accusation, 
which is imperative to his hypothesis. Accusation, is what lies at the 
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root ofany principle of obligation. Throughhis reductive hermeneu­
tics, Nietzsche strips away the a priori character of such a system, 
what Ricoeur names onto-theology, using the terminology of 
Heidegger.10 Ricoeur elaborates this notion by explaining that 
accusation appears as the truth of formal obligation and the root of 
duty, but does so only by the uncovering of the hermeneutic method. 
Nietzsche's reductive hermeneutics replaces normal abstractive 
methodology with that of a genealogical and philological methodol­
ogy.ll Hence, and so much is suggested in The Genealogy ofMorals, 
this reductive hermeneutics reveals the illusion of the so-called 
"autonomous will." He exposes what was hidden in its background, 
namely the resentment of the will of the weak. Ricoeur asserts, 
"Because of this exegesis and this genealogy, the god of morality, to 
speak in the manner of Nietzsche, reveals himself as the god of 
accusation and condemnation."12 
We cannow turn to Ricoeur's third question; again, the question 
asks what sort of authority belongs to the announcement of this 
death. We have already suggested which god is dead, namely the 
god of morality, and as well, have agreed that the cause of this death 
was nihilism and its resulting destruction of metaphysics. As to this 
third question, however, Ricoeur suggests that everything becomes 
problematic. Ricoeur asserts, "This positive Nitzschean philosophy, 
which alone is capable of conferring authority on his negative 
hermeneutics, remains buried under the ruins that Nietzsche has 
accumulated around him."13 If the authority of this announcement 
is suggested by Zarathustra, few individuals can live up to his level, 
or to the level of the overman. Ricoeursuggests here that Nietzsche's 
work remains an accusation of accusation, and hence falls short. 
From this, Ricoeur concludes that everything is left open. At this 
point, he moves back to his original hypothesis. Ricoeur asserts: 
It seems to me that only one path has been decisively closed 
off, that of an onto-theology which culminates in the idea of 
a moral god, conceived as the origin and foundation of an 
ethics of prohibition and condemnation. I believe that we are 
henceforth incapable of returning to an order of moral life 
which would take the form of the simple submission to 
commandments or to an alien or supreme will, even if this 
will were represented as divine.14 
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Ricoeur is suggesting that, although Nietzsche's reductive herme­
neutics leaves no room for the existence of a god of morality, or on a 
metaphysical level an ideal, absolute good, that an opening to faith 
still is possible. 
Here, Ricoeur introduces his relationship to word, specifically, 
all forms of word that say something about beings and about Being. 
The editor of this essay, James M. Edie, suggests that this has been 
translated in the Heideggerian context, "word" coming from the 
French la parole ("speech" or "spoken language").15 In this sense, he 
explains, "word" is used as the"third sense" between language and 
the "speaking" of the subject-"word" comes to us, it is not at our 
disposal. In other words, although we have control over our act of 
speaking, the words which we use are conventionally predeter­
mined; they are not freely chosen by us. Hence, through this 
relationship to word, Ricoeur implies a notion of obedience that is 
independentofanysortofethicalimplication;inordertounderstand 
anything about Being, we obediently depend upon word which, 
again, is not at our disposal. Ricoeur adds in light of this, "It is this 
non-ethical obedience that can lead us out of the labyrinth of the 
theory of values."16 It is this notion which drives Ricoeur's hypoth­
esis, that a postreligious faith can stem from Nietzsche's destruction 
of the god of morals. 
But, how is this move possible? Ricoeur suggests that the only 
way to think ethically in this situation is to begin by thinking non­
ethically. This is indicative of something along the lines of Nietzsche's 
notion of the Will to Truth stemming out of the Will to Ignorance. 
Ricoeur asserts, "In order to attain this goal, we must discover that 
place where the autonomy of our will is rooted in a dependence and 
an obedience that is no longer infected with accusation, prohibition, 
and condemnation."17 The pre-ethical situation Ricoeur describes is 
indicative of a Heideggerian hearkening, in which there is revealed a 
mode of being which is not yet a mode of doing. In other words, 
II word" says something; it reveals not only something about the 
meaning of beings, but as well, something about Being itselfYI 
Coinciding with the notion of a non-ethical obedience, it is important 
to note that with Ricoeur's understanding of word, as with his 
understanding of metaphor, something is said or revealed of which 
he is "neither the source or the master." 
In this situation, where the philosopher is independent of the 
source and mastery of the meaning of being, an obedience is estab­
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lished with regard to the power of "word." This allows for a non­
ethical obedience andconcern, whatRicoeur names the postreligious 
faith. Hence, the philosopher is still notcapable of designating a kind 
of word th~t could truly be called the word of God. However, 
Ricoeur contests, she is capable of designating the type of being that 
would make something like the word of God possible.19 Prior to all 
moralism, Ricoeur continues, we perceive of this hearkening, the 
foundation of all other modes of listening. He concludes, NThis 
analysis, and 'the fundamental analysis of Dasein' to which it per­
tains, reveals the horizon and opens up the way to approximations, 
yet to be established/ to a relation to God as the word whichproceeds 
all accusation and prohibition."2o In other words, a non-ethical 
obedience can stem from the situation of hearkening, through which 
one must listen to the independent word which is indicative of the 
meaning and instance of Being, this word being non~accusing and 
non-prohibiting, but being itself, as Ricouer readlily suggests, God. 
In other words, the ultimate word of Being, which is not at our own 
disposal, but rather, comes to us, is the word of God. This suggests, 
then, an ethical situation that is merely an ethics of our desire to exist, 
an appropriation of our effort to be.21 
I wish to offer here a different interpretation which Ricoeur has 
overlooked. Let us return to his answer to the third question posited 
earlier. What sort of authority is invested in the proclamation of the 
deathof God? As displayed above, Ricoeur concludes first, that only 
one path has been closed off, that being an onto-theology with the 
idea of a moral god conceived as the origin of an ethics of prohibition 
and accusation. Next, he develops this non-ethical obedience through 
the Heideggerian concept of hearkening, allowing for an ethical 
system of faith dependent upon our desire to be. However, I amnot 
convinced that Ricoeur has constructed a complete analysis. Let us 
look again at The Madman, in Nietzsche's work. 
I wish to propose a hermeneutic analysis similar to Ricoeur's, one 
of metaphorical reference. Let us imagine that God is merely a 
metaphor signifying the metaphysical concepts of the ideal or abso" 
lute good. As Sarah Kofman paints out in her work, Nietzsche and 
Metaphor: 
Knowledge and mastery are one and the same thing: one 
cannot aim at' objectivity' by cutting oneself off from every 
'point of view' but, on the contrary, one needs to multiply 
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perspectives in order to see 'the world' with the greatest 
possible number of 'eyes,' constructing and deconstructing 
worlds as an artist.22 
The Nietzschean idea Kofman seems to be alluding to directly 
pertains to The Madman. Again, let us consider God as a metaphor. 
This perspectivism of "the greatest possible number of 'eyes'" sug­
gests that we discount no interpretation as to the meaning of meta­
phor. 
Let us noW consider Ricoeur's own metaphorical reference. He 
states, "Literal meaning is the totality of the semantic field, the set of 
possible contextualuseswhich constitutes the polysemy of a word.flll 
Thus, the literal meaning of the notion of God would require such a 
totality of contextual uses. What Nietzsche is suggesting in The 
Madman is the impossibility of this very notion. One could not 
possibly entertain the concept of God in totality. Such, at a minimal 
level, includes the notion of an infinite, supreme, all-seeing, all­
knowing being who is unseen and immaterial yet denotes the power 
to interject within our lives. It is entirely impossible for humans to 
comprehend such aspects, and thus, it is impossible to conceive of 
God as possessing any literal meaning. Hence, Nietzsche seems to be 
asserting to his readers the fact that, due to this impossibility, no one 
is truly capable of taking seriously the idea of God, and hence, God 
is not only a metaphor, but a dead metaphor. TIlerefore, we find the 
assertion of the madman that God is dead. 
Kofman points out a few of the consequences of this notion. We 
shall consider these in regard to Ricoeur's question of the authority 
of proclaiming God's death. She asserts: 
After the" death of God" all concepts change their meaning, 
lose their lueaning: themadmanwho lights a lantern in broad 
daylight to look for God symbolizes the confusion of man 
when the traditional norms collapse, when meaning is re­
moved. From that point on, all "lunacy" becomes possible 
and all absurdity licit: day no longer means day, nor night, 
night, when the rigorous architecture of the concepts is 
dislocated and reduced to fragments of wreckage floating 
without direction on an enigmatic and infinite sea. TIle 
IIdeath ofGod," abolishinganyproper, any absolute centre of 
reference, plunges man into Heraclitus' "becoming-mad." 
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Thus ... all hierarchical oppositions based on an absolute 
distinction between "high" and "low" collapse.24 
Ricoeur was correct in his assertion that the death of God results 
in the destruction of metaphysics through Nihilism, but it does not 
follow that anything particular is left open as he suggests. As 
Kofman notes, all hierarchical oppositions, i.e. "high and low" and 
"good and evil," collapse. This is what Nietzsche means by his 
notion"beyond good and evil." With no suchbinary opposition left, 
there is no room for any type of morality or faith. 
Since Ricoeur proposes the notion of a non-ethical obligation via 
our driving effort for existence, he presupposes that existence is 
superior to non-existence. This suggests the continuation of hierar­
chical opposites, which are destroyed with the death of God. There 
is left no possibility of any system of merit, which Ricoeur's 
postreligious faith seems to dependon. The authority of the madman's 
proclamation of the death of God, then, is rather Nietzsche's call for 
a move beyond good and evil. Neither is deemed superior, for such 
binary opposites no longer apply. On the other hand, he calls to the 
free spirits, or thenewphilosophers,whowill utilize this perspectivist 
hermeneutics of "the greatest possible number of 'eyes'." In doing 
such, a faith may exist in this very perspectivism, but it could have 
no possible association with God, the ideal, or an absolute good, for 
each of these maintain the notion of a hierarchical opposition. 
The closing words of the madman are also important. He states, 
"This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant 
stars-and yet they have done it themselves."25 Keeping in mind the 
above analysis of the death ofGod, in whichGod has become a dead 
metaphor, it is the people who have created God as a dead metaphor, 
this has been done as a result of the impossibility of conceivingGod 
in a literal sense. He therefore has become stale or dead, in that it 
proves impossible to take his meaning seriously. In the case of 
metaphors, we do not realize when they become stale or dead. No 
one can paint to the particular time when such occurs, it does so at a 
distance from us. 
As welt the section following The Madman. seems to coincide with 
what I am suggesting here. It reads, "Mystical explanations are 
considered deep. The truth is thatthey are not even superficia1."26 In 
other words, mystical explanations are not explanations at all, they 
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onl y seem to be. As such, any notion of faith related to God - even 
this non-ethical one that Ricoeur is suggesting - is not a true expla­
nation. And, as well, it definitely cannot follow from the death of 
God, and consequently of metaphysics. 
Ricoeur provides an excellent analysis of Nietzsche's atheism. 
His inquiry into The Madman is quite good, well thought out and 
complete. However, I must disagree with his hypothesis. Although 
the nihilism of Nietzschean atheism creates the collapse of meta­
physics, it does not seem to allow any room for a postreligious faith. 
Although Ricoeur's conclusion is coherent and seems to make sense, 
it does not follow from Nietzsche's thought. Hence, I am forced to 
conclude that Ricoeur's hypothesis is not valid. He suggests that 
atheism is not limited to the mere negation and destruction of 
religion, but rather, that itopens the horizon for a postreligious faith. 
I suggest in reply, the impossibility of such: God is still dead. 
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